Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/4 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations86 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Extend HSTS max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year) to meet the preload list criteria
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records2 A records, 115 ms lookupPASS
| A | 172.67.144.74, 104.21.95.104 |
| AAAA | 2606:4700:3037::ac43:904a, 2606:4700:3037::6815:5f68 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | scott.ns.cloudflare.com, khloe.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | — |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 include:spf.brevo.com ~all brevo-code:00b18897cff7a9928be1c3fd00c6ab0d google-site-verification=x4kKc2ZHMKXKxwfOJoKzRG3xUEBbs2GH1IRtTxrzhQw |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 24ms across 3 resolvers (spread 8ms)PASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://tomorrowspayment.com
387 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://tomorrowspayment.com | 200 | 387 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (16 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 110 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Allow: /
Disallow: /hq-3278/
Disallow: /api/
Disallow: /publisher
Sitemap: https://tomorrowspayment.com/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligencetomorrowspayment.com — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 2 months oldPASS
301 days
July 19, 2027
86 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
2 months
Registered July 19, 2026
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2606:4700:3037::6815:5f68
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Newly registered domain — build backlinks and content to establish SEO trust
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Newly registered domains may face SEO trust challenges. Search engines generally give more authority to older domains. This is informational — not a problem to fix.
Informational: domain age. Newer domains may have lower trust signals in spam/security filters.
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice