Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/6 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations73 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records3 A records, 27 ms lookupPASS
| A | 104.26.13.238, 172.67.69.95, 104.26.12.238 |
| AAAA | 2606:4700:20::681a:cee, 2606:4700:20::681a:dee, 2606:4700:20::ac43:455f |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | leonard.ns.cloudflare.com, treasure.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | 10 mail.truffa.net |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 7ms across 3 resolvers (spread 9ms)PASS
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 235 ms totalPASS
https://truffa.net
130 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.truffa.net/
105 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://truffa.net | 301 | 130 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 2 | https://www.truffa.net/ | 200 | 105 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (2 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 5 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /comments/feed
Disallow: /feed/$
Disallow: /*/feed/$
Disallow: /*/feed/rss/$
Disallow: /*/trackback/$
Disallow: /*/*/feed/$
Disallow: /*/*/feed/rss/$
Disallow: /*/*/trackback/$
Disallow: /*/*/*/feed/$
Disallow: /*/*/*/feed/rss/$
Disallow: /*/*/*/trackback/$
Disallow: /trackback/
Disallow: /wp-admin/
Allow: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
Disallow: /*.inc$
Disallow: */trackback/
User-agent: Mediapartners-Google
Allow: /
User-agent: Adsbot-Google
Allow: /
User-agent: Googlebot-Image
Allow: /
User-agent: Googlebot-Mobile
Allow: /
User-agent: ia_archiver
Disallow: /
Sitemap: https://www.truffa.net/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligencetruffa.net — via RegistryGate GmbH, 18 years, 11 months oldPASS
109 days
November 26, 2026
73 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
18 years, 11 months
Registered November 26, 2007
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2606:4700:20::681a:dee
RegistryGate GmbH
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice