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https://ufrj.br

Infrastructure

· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
90
GRADE
A
FIX
1
REVIEW
3
PASS
5
INFO
0
Probed from Madrid, Spain
200 OK
Checks
9
5 PASS 3 REVIEW 1 FIX
D
CDN & Delivery
Action
No CDN detected
FIX
No CDN detected
Warning::
No CDN detected
A CDN can significantly improve load times for users around the world by caching content at edge nodes closer to them.
No CDN detected

Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.

C
IPv6 Readiness
Action
No IPv6 support
REVIEW
No IPv6 support
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records found
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No IPv6 Support
About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B
HTTP Probe Timing
Total 1482 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown
REVIEW
DNS Lookup DNS Lookup — time to resolve the domain name to an IP address.
406 ms
TCP Connect TCP Connect — time to establish a TCP connection to the server.
220 ms
TLS Handshake TLS Handshake — time to complete the HTTPS encryption handshake.
223 ms
Time to First Byte Time to First Byte — how long the server takes to respond with the first byte of data.
1.29 s
Total Time Total request time from DNS lookup through full response.
1.48 s

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 406 ms TCP Connect 220 ms TLS Handshake 223 ms Server Processing 439 ms Content Transfer 193 ms
B
TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations
36 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to address
REVIEW

Certificate validity

36
days left
0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

  • Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
  • Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
  • Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
  • Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A
DNS Records
1 A records, 220 ms lookup
PASS
1 A records, 220 ms lookup
Info::
Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)
Got: 200.156.137.16
Info::
Single A record — no DNS redundancy
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records
Info::
2 nameserver(s) configured
Got: ns.ufrj.br, nsx.ufrj.br
Info::
1 mail exchanger(s) configured
Info::
CAA records not checked
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Info::
SPF record present in TXT
Warning::
DNS resolution is slow (220 ms)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
Got: 220 ms
A200.156.137.16
AAAA
CNAME
NSns.ufrj.br, nsx.ufrj.br
MX
9 smtp.ufrj.br
TXT
SPF v=spf1 ip4:146.164.170.13/32 ip4:146.164.170.153/32 -all
CAALookup not available with standard resolver
Resolved in 220 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.

Why this matters

Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.

Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.

Why this matters

DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.

Source: DNS performance benchmarks

A+
Redirect Chain
No redirects — direct access
PASS
No redirects — direct access
Info::
No redirects — direct access
Got: https://ufrj.br

https://ufrj.br

884 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#URLStatusTimeProtocolServer
1https://ufrj.br200884 msHTTP/1.1nginx/1.29.3
A+
Crawlability
robots.txt present, sitemap with 7 URLs
PASS
robots.txt present, sitemap with 7 URLs
Info::
robots.txt is present
Got: 108 bytes
Info::
sitemap.xml is present
Info::
sitemap.xml is valid XML
Info::
sitemap.xml contains 7 entries
Info::
Sitemap index with 7 child sitemaps
Info::
robots.txt references sitemap
robots.txt 200 OK
Size 108 B Sitemaps referenced 1 User-agents * Blocking No — crawling allowed
User-agent: *
Disallow: /wp-admin/
Allow: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php

Sitemap: https://ufrj.br/wp-sitemap.xml

A+
URL Variants
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
PASS
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
Info::
www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: non-www)
Info::
HTTP correctly 301-redirects to HTTPS

www / non-www

301https://www.ufrj.br/
200https://ufrj.br/

Preferred variant: non-www

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://ufrj.br/ https://ufrj.br/

Consistent

A+
Domain Intelligence
ufrj.br — 30 years, 8 months old, hosted on Fundacao Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa, BR
PASS
ufrj.br — 30 years, 8 months old, hosted on Fundacao Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa, BR
Info::
DNSSEC is not enabled
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Warning::
Registrar lock is NOT enabled
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Info::
Hosting: Fundacao Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa, BR
Got: AS2715
Domain expiry

Unknown

SSL certificate

36 days

Issued by Let's Encrypt

Domain age

30 years, 8 months

Registered January 1, 1996

DNSSEC

Not enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

Fundacao Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa, BR

ASN AS2715

200.156.137.16

Registrar

Registrar unknown

Unlocked 2 NS records
Expiry timeline
Today
+1 year
SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)
Recommended actions
  • Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
  • Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Registrar
Created January 1, 1996 (30 years, 8 months ago)
Last Updated June 6, 2023
Name Servers ns.ufrj.br, nsx.ufrj.br
DNSSEC Not enabled
Registrant UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Hosting
IP Address 200.156.137.16
ASN AS2715 (Fundacao Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa, BR)
Provider Fundacao Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa, BR
Data source: rdap (0.9s)

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Why this matters

Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.

Learn more

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.

Source: ICANN / RFC 4033

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice

All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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