Security - https://vercel.com BeaverCheck Audit

D

Content Security Policy

Action

4 of 10 CSP checks passed

FIX

4 of 10 CSP checks passed

Raw CSP policy

Got: default-src 'self' vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/*;script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' 'inline-speculation-rules' https://snap.licdn.com https://www.youtube.com cdn.vercel-insights.com va.vercel-scripts.com vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/* cdp.vercel.com;style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/*;img-src 'self' blob: data: *.github.io avatars.githubusercontent.com user-images.githubusercontent.com vercel.com vercel.live *.vercel.sh assets.vercel.com cdn.raster.app https://images.ctfassets.net https://www.google.com https://i.ytimg.com https://s3.amazonaws.com pbs.twimg.com https://www.gravatar.com https://lishhsx6kmthaacj.public.blob.vercel-storage.com https://fvqcrhkhgatlyl2m.public.blob.vercel-storage.com;media-src 'self' blob: data: vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/*;connect-src 'self' data: *.ingest.sentry.io *.ingest.us.sentry.io wss://ws-us3.pusher.com sockjs-use3.pusher.com react-tweet.vercel.app https://*.contentful.com www.vercel-status.com unpkg.com vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/* cdp.vercel.com;font-src 'self' vercel.com assets.vercel.com vercel.live fonts.gstatic.com *.vercel.sh;frame-ancestors 'self' https://vercel.com https://app.contentful.com https://*.contentful.com https://*.vercel.sh https://*.vercel.com

default-src directive is set

Got: default-src 'self' vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/*

'unsafe-inline' found in script source

'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.

Got: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' 'inline-speculation-rules' https://snap.licdn.com https://www.youtube.com cdn.vercel-insights.com va.vercel-scripts.com vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/* cdp.vercel.com

'unsafe-eval' found in script source

'unsafe-eval' allows eval() and similar functions, enabling code injection. Remove it.

Got: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' 'inline-speculation-rules' https://snap.licdn.com https://www.youtube.com cdn.vercel-insights.com va.vercel-scripts.com vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.live wss://*.vercel.com *.codesandbox.io localhost:* chrome-extension://* https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://risk.clearbit.com https://react-tweet.vercel.app/* cdp.vercel.com

No wildcard in script source

object-src falls back to default-src

base-uri directive is missing

Without base-uri, attackers can inject a <base> tag to hijack relative URLs. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.

Expected: base-uri 'self'

frame-ancestors directive is set

Got: frame-ancestors 'self' https://vercel.com https://app.contentful.com https://*.contentful.com https://*.vercel.sh https://*.vercel.com

form-action directive is missing

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'

upgrade-insecure-requests is not set

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.

Why this matters

Unsafe value (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval) in script-src defeats CSP's main protection — XSS injections can execute again.

Learn more ▾

unsafe-inline allows inline <script> tags; unsafe-eval allows eval() and similar. Both are necessary for some legacy code but explicitly dangerous. Migrate to nonces (per-page random tokens) or hashes (per-script SHA-256) instead.

Source: OWASP CSP / MDN

'unsafe-eval' allows eval() and similar functions, enabling code injection. Remove it.

Why this matters

Unsafe value (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval) in script-src defeats CSP's main protection — XSS injections can execute again.

Learn more ▾

unsafe-inline allows inline <script> tags; unsafe-eval allows eval() and similar. Both are necessary for some legacy code but explicitly dangerous. Migrate to nonces (per-page random tokens) or hashes (per-script SHA-256) instead.

Source: OWASP CSP / MDN

Without base-uri, attackers can inject a <base> tag to hijack relative URLs. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.

Expected: base-uri 'self'

Why this matters

Missing base-uri in CSP leaves a base-tag injection attack path open even on otherwise strict policies.

Learn more ▾

A common omission: developers add CSP for script-src and frame-ancestors but forget base-uri. The result is a CSP that looks strict but lets an attacker rewrite every URL on the page via <base href>. Add `base-uri 'self'` to close the gap.

Source: MDN CSP

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

Why this matters

Without upgrade-insecure-requests, any HTTP subresource link survives as a mixed-content warning instead of auto-upgrading.

Learn more ▾

Adding `upgrade-insecure-requests` to your CSP turns every http:// subresource fetch into https:// at the browser layer. One-line defense against accidental mixed content from legacy links or third-party widgets.

Source: MDN CSP

Parsed Policy

default-src 'self'vercel.com*.vercel.comassets.vercel.com*.vercel.shvercel.livewss://*.vercel.com*.codesandbox.iolocalhost:*chrome-extension://*https://www.youtube-nocookie.comhttps://risk.clearbit.comhttps://react-tweet.vercel.app/*

script-src 'self''unsafe-eval''unsafe-inline''inline-speculation-rules'https://snap.licdn.comhttps://www.youtube.comcdn.vercel-insights.comva.vercel-scripts.comvercel.com*.vercel.comassets.vercel.com*.vercel.shvercel.livewss://*.vercel.com*.codesandbox.iolocalhost:*chrome-extension://*https://www.youtube-nocookie.comhttps://risk.clearbit.comhttps://react-tweet.vercel.app/*cdp.vercel.com

style-src 'self''unsafe-inline'vercel.com*.vercel.comassets.vercel.com*.vercel.shvercel.livewss://*.vercel.com*.codesandbox.iolocalhost:*chrome-extension://*https://www.youtube-nocookie.comhttps://risk.clearbit.comhttps://react-tweet.vercel.app/*

img-src 'self'blob:data:*.github.ioavatars.githubusercontent.comuser-images.githubusercontent.comvercel.comvercel.live*.vercel.shassets.vercel.comcdn.raster.apphttps://images.ctfassets.nethttps://www.google.comhttps://i.ytimg.comhttps://s3.amazonaws.compbs.twimg.comhttps://www.gravatar.comhttps://lishhsx6kmthaacj.public.blob.vercel-storage.comhttps://fvqcrhkhgatlyl2m.public.blob.vercel-storage.com

media-src 'self'blob:data:vercel.com*.vercel.comassets.vercel.com*.vercel.shvercel.livewss://*.vercel.com*.codesandbox.iolocalhost:*chrome-extension://*https://www.youtube-nocookie.comhttps://risk.clearbit.comhttps://react-tweet.vercel.app/*

connect-src 'self'data:*.ingest.sentry.io*.ingest.us.sentry.iowss://ws-us3.pusher.comsockjs-use3.pusher.comreact-tweet.vercel.apphttps://*.contentful.comwww.vercel-status.comunpkg.comvercel.com*.vercel.comassets.vercel.com*.vercel.shvercel.livewss://*.vercel.com*.codesandbox.iolocalhost:*chrome-extension://*https://www.youtube-nocookie.comhttps://risk.clearbit.comhttps://react-tweet.vercel.app/*cdp.vercel.com

font-src 'self'vercel.comassets.vercel.comvercel.livefonts.gstatic.com*.vercel.sh

frame-ancestors 'self'https://vercel.comhttps://app.contentful.comhttps://*.contentful.comhttps://*.vercel.shhttps://*.vercel.com

F

Permissions-Policy Granularity

Action

0% high-risk feature coverage (0/10)

FIX

0% high-risk feature coverage (0/10)

Permissions-Policy covers 0/10 high-risk features (0%)

The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 0/10 high-risk features. Covered: Not declared (default-allow): camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.

Got: 0% (0/10)

D

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Action

Referrer-Policy is `origin-when-cross-origin` (leaky -- origin sent cross-origin even on protocol downgrade)

FIX

Referrer-Policy is `origin-when-cross-origin` (leaky -- origin sent cross-origin even on protocol downgrade)

Referrer-Policy: `origin-when-cross-origin` -- leaky -- origin sent cross-origin even on protocol downgrade

Same-origin requests get full URL; cross-origin gets only origin. Similar shape to the modern default BUT does NOT suppress Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade -- the origin leaks even when the protocol is downgrading to HTTP. Switch to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` for the same UX with no downgrade leak.

Got: origin-when-cross-origin

C

Security Headers

Action

5 of 10 headers properly configured

REVIEW

5 of 10 headers properly configured

Strict-Transport-Security is properly configured

Got: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: DENY

Referrer-Policy has a weak value

Got: origin-when-cross-origin Expected: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Permissions-Policy header is missing

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Content-Security-Policy is present

Got: default-src 'self' vercel.com *.vercel.com assets.vercel.com *.vercel.sh vercel.…

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header reveals technology stack

This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.

Got: Next.js, Payload

Server header is present without version info

Got: Vercel

Domain is in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: preloaded)

Got: preloaded

Expected: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Why this matters

Weak Referrer-Policy values leak full URLs (with query params, tokens, IDs) to every third-party resource on the page.

Learn more ▾

Default referrer behavior shares the full referring URL with images, scripts, and other resources from third-party origins. If your URLs contain tokens, session IDs, or user emails (in query strings or paths), every third-party tracker gets them. Set `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter).

Source: MDN Referrer-Policy / W3C

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Why this matters

Permissions-Policy locks down browser APIs you don't use — without it, every page can request camera/mic/geolocation if XSS lands.

Learn more ▾

By default every page can request the camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, and dozens more. Permissions-Policy turns off the ones you don't need so a future bug can't quietly start using them. It's a defense-in-depth header — one line, big surface reduction.

Source: MDN / W3C

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.

Why this matters

X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.3 advertises your stack to attackers — disable it.

Learn more ▾

X-Powered-By and similar headers (X-AspNet-Version, X-Runtime) tell attackers which versions to target. Disable in your server/framework config: PHP `expose_php=Off`, ASP.NET `<httpRuntime enableVersionHeader="false">`, Express `app.disable('x-powered-by')`.

Source: OWASP

B

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

C

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

Action

46 inline style attribute(s) detected

REVIEW

46 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 46 inline style(s) is moderate. Affected element types include: div, svg, span, a, button. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

B

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

Trusted Types not enabled

REVIEW

Trusted Types not enabled

Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.

B

Email Security

DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all, DKIM, BIMI

REVIEW

DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all, DKIM, BIMI

DMARC policy is quarantine — good protection

SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

DKIM configured (selectors: k1, google, s2, s1)

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI configured and DMARC enforced — logo will display

DMARC

Policy quarantine — good protection Record v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:df9481016e14030@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com; ruf=mailto:df9481016e14030@for.dmarcanalyzer.com; pct=100; fo=1;

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

B

API Surface

1 OpenAPI/Swagger spec exposed

REVIEW

1 OpenAPI/Swagger spec exposed

OpenAPI / Swagger spec exposed at /openapi.json

An openly-accessible OpenAPI / Swagger spec hands attackers the complete endpoint catalog: every path, parameter, request body, and response shape. Internal-only APIs should restrict the spec to authenticated developers; public APIs should accept the disclosure as documentation. Either is a deliberate choice -- the warning surfaces the choice rather than dictating it.

C

Permissions-Policy

Action

0 directives, 5 missing

REVIEW

0 directives, 5 missing

camera not restricted

Consider adding camera=() to block camera access from embedded content.

microphone not restricted

Consider adding microphone=() to block microphone access from embedded content.

geolocation not restricted

Consider adding geolocation=() to block geolocation access from embedded content.

payment not restricted

Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.

usb not restricted

Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

fullscreen 'self'; camera 'none'

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

camera Not Set

microphone Not Set

geolocation Not Set

payment Not Set

usb Not Set

C

CORS Configuration

Action

Origin: *

REVIEW

Origin: *

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — unrestricted

Any website can read this resource's response. Appropriate for public APIs but not for user-specific content.

Origin reflection not testable with a single request

Some servers reflect the request Origin header. This requires manual testing with a crafted Origin header.

CORS Configuration Permissive

Allow-Origin *

Any website can read responses from this resource.

Header	Value	Status
Access-Control-Allow-Origin	*	⚠

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is negotiated

Got: h2

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 55 days)

Got: 2026-10-22T06:47:25Z

Certificate chain has 3 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: SHA256-RSA

Certificate covers 2 domain(s)

Got: *.vercel.com, vercel.com

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

h2 (HTTP/2)

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=*.vercel.comIssuer CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-07-24T06:47:26Z → 2026-10-22T06:47:25ZExpires in 55 days SANs *.vercel.com, vercel.comSignature SHA256-RSASerial 6ae5bcce639f382da202570bbdb7aee3ac6

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USValid 2025-09-03T00:00:00Z → 2028-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 737 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z → 2032-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 2198 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f

A

Cookie Security

3 cookies analyzed, 6 checks passed

PASS

3 cookies analyzed, 6 checks passed

Cookie '_v-consent' has the Secure flag

Cookie '_v-consent' is missing the HttpOnly flag

Without HttpOnly, this cookie can be accessed by JavaScript, making it vulnerable to XSS-based theft.

Cookie '_v-consent' has SameSite=Lax

Cookie '_v-anonymous-id' has the Secure flag

Cookie '_v-anonymous-id' is missing the HttpOnly flag

Without HttpOnly, this cookie can be accessed by JavaScript, making it vulnerable to XSS-based theft.

Cookie '_v-anonymous-id' has SameSite=Lax

Cookie '_v-anonymous-id-renewed' has the Secure flag

Cookie '_v-anonymous-id-renewed' is missing the HttpOnly flag

Without HttpOnly, this cookie can be accessed by JavaScript, making it vulnerable to XSS-based theft.

Cookie '_v-anonymous-id-renewed' has SameSite=Lax

3 cookies analyzed 3 warnings

Name	Secure	HttpOnly	SameSite	Size	Issues
_v-consent	✓	✗	Lax	137 B	1
_v-anonymous-id	✓	✗	Lax	36 B	2
_v-anonymous-id-renewed	✓	✗	Lax	24 B	1

A+

Cookie Hygiene

All 3 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

PASS

All 3 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

A+

security.txt

Vulnerability disclosure policy

PASS

Vulnerability disclosure policy

security.txt found

Got: https://vercel.com/.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

Contact: https://hackerone.com/vercel-open-source, mailto:responsible.disclosure@vercel.com

Expires: 2027-05-27T12:00:00.000Z

Policy: https://vercel.com/.well-known/security.txt

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

All 21 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

PASS

All 21 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

Subresource Integrity Adoption

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

PASS

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI

A

CORS Depth

1 CORS depth signal(s) detected

PASS

1 CORS depth signal(s) detected

CORS allows any origin (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)

Any website can fetch this URL via JavaScript and read the response body. Acceptable for genuinely public APIs (e.g. CDN-served static assets). Risky if the URL returns user-specific or session-derived data, since other origins can scrape it via the user's browser without needing credentials. Narrow Allow-Origin to a specific origin allow-list when the response is sensitive.

Got: Allow-Origin: *

A+

Source Map Exposure

No source maps accessible (probed 10 candidate URL(s))

PASS

No source maps accessible (probed 10 candidate URL(s))

No source maps accessible across 10 probed candidate(s)

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

security.txt is present — good practice

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✗ Exposed	Security Policy	Info
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised

HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.

HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains, preload)

HSTS preload enabled

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)