Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNS Records16 A records, 254 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 172.217.29.142, 172.217.28.46, 172.217.28.174, 172.217.30.110, 172.217.28.78, 142.251.135.238, 172.217.29.110, 172.217.28.206, 142.250.78.110, 172.217.28.142, 172.217.30.78, 142.250.78.142, 172.217.30.14, 172.217.29.238, 142.250.219.238, 142.250.219.206 |
| AAAA | 2800:3f0:4001:814::200e, 2800:3f0:4001:815::200e, 2800:3f0:4001:80e::200e, 2800:3f0:4001:80d::200e |
| CNAME | youtube-ui.l.google.com |
| NS | — |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/20 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 39ms across 3 resolvers (spread 115ms)REVIEW
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations63 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://www.youtube.com
409 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.youtube.com | 200 | 409 ms | HTTP/1.1 | ESF |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (2 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 20 URLsPASS
# robots.txt file for YouTube
# Created in the distant future (the year 2000) after
# the robotic uprising of the mid 90's which wiped out all humans.
User-agent: Mediapartners-Google*
Disallow:
User-agent: *
Disallow: /api/
Disallow: /comment
Disallow: /feeds/videos.xml
Disallow: /file_download
Disallow: /get_video
Disallow: /get_video_info
Disallow: /get_midroll_info
Disallow: /live_chat
Disallow: /login
Disallow: /qr
Disallow: /results
Disallow: /signup
Disallow: /t/terms
Disallow: /timedtext_video
Disallow: /verify_age
Disallow: /watch_ajax
Disallow: /watch_fragments_ajax
Disallow: /watch_popup
Disallow: /watch_queue_ajax
Disallow: /youtubei/
Sitemap: https://www.youtube.com/sitemaps/sitemap.xml
Sitemap: https://www.youtube.com/product/sitemap.xml
- https://www.youtube.com/sitemaps/misc.xm...
- https://www.youtube.com/kids/sitemap.xml
- https://www.youtube.com/trends/sitemap.x...
- https://about.youtube/sitemap.xml
- https://www.youtube.com/jobs/sitemap.xml
- https://www.youtube.com/creators/sitemap...
- https://www.youtube.com/csai-match/sitem...
- https://www.youtube.com/originals/guidel...
- https://contributors.youtube.com/sitemap...
- https://socialimpact.youtube.com/sitemap...
- https://vr.youtube.com/sitemap.xml
- https://artists.youtube/sitemap.xml
- https://www.youtube.com/measurementprogr...
- https://www.youtube.com/go/family/sitema...
- https://www.youtube.com/yt/terms/sitemap...
- https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/...
- https://www.youtube.com/myfamily/sitemap...
- https://health.youtube/sitemap.xml
- https://news.youtube/sitemap.xml
- https://research.youtube/sitemap.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligenceyoutube.com — via MarkMonitor Inc., 21 years, 6 months oldPASS
273 days
February 15, 2027
63 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
21 years, 6 months
Registered February 15, 2005
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2800:3f0:4001:81a::200e
MarkMonitor Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice