Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/4 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
CMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedActionMean 176ms across 3 resolvers (spread 295ms)REVIEW
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BHTTP Probe TimingTotal 1458 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownREVIEW
Connection waterfall
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations34 days until leaf cert expires — 5 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Extend HSTS max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year) to meet the preload list criteria
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
ADNS Records4 A records, 336 ms lookupPASS
| A | 198.185.159.145, 198.185.159.144, 198.49.23.144, 198.49.23.145 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns1.sitehost.co.nz, ns4.sitehost.co.nz, ns2.sitehost.co.nz, ns3.sitehost.co.nz |
| MX | 1 SMTP.GOOGLE.com |
| TXT | google-site-verification=r3hU4uIh7BumLBbVza-SS7H3cS5Kw7a-5hSDT5xS1QY |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://Lovemedia.nz
88 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://Lovemedia.nz | 200 | 88 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Squarespace |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 17 URLsPASS
# Squarespace Robots Txt
User-agent: AI2Bot
User-agent: Ai2Bot-Dolma
User-agent: aiHitBot
User-agent: Amazonbot
User-agent: anthropic-ai
User-agent: Applebot-Extended
User-agent: Bytespider
User-agent: CCBot
User-agent: ClaudeBot
User-agent: cohere-ai
User-agent: cohere-training-data-crawler
User-agent: DuckAssistBot
User-agent: FacebookBot
User-agent: Google-Extended
User-agent: GoogleOther
User-agent: GoogleOther-Image
User-agent: GoogleOther-Video
User-agent: GPTBot
User-agent: img2dataset
User-agent: Meta-ExternalAgent
User-agent: MyCentralAIScraperBot
User-agent: omgili
User-agent: omgilibot
User-agent: Quora-Bot
User-agent: TikTokSpider
User-agent: YouBot
User-agent: AdsBot-Google
User-agent: AdsBot-Google-Mobile
User-agent: AdsBot-Google-Mobile-Apps
User-agent: *
Disallow: /config
Disallow: /search
Disallow: /account$
Disallow: /account/
Disallow: /commerce/digital-download/
Disallow: /api/
Allow: /api/ui-extensions/
Disallow: /static/
Disallow:/*?author=*
Disallow:/*&author=*
Disallow:/*?tag=*
Disallow:/*&tag=*
Disallow:/*?month=*
Disallow:/*&month=*
Disallow:/*?view=*
Disallow:/*&view=*
Disallow:/*?format=json
Disallow:/*&format=json
Disallow:/*?format=page-context
Disallow:/*&format=page-context
Disallow:/*?format=main-content
Disallow:/*&format=main-content
Disallow:/*?format=json-pretty
Disallow:/*&format=json-pretty
Disallow:/*?format=ical
Disallow:/*&format=ical
Disallow:/*?reversePaginate=*
Disallow:/*&reversePaginate=*
Sitemap: https://lovemedia.nz/sitemap.xml
- https://lovemedia.nz/television/rachaelpatching
- https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5a2711f68fd4d2c5ea9d0da9/1512965167562-FOWD2A0KSWZIWXBFJQD9/Philips+Puppets.jpg
- https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5a2711f68fd4d2c5ea9d0da9/1512551465208-8QPHHEVBS9AHFARNVOAI/Cameron+clapp.jpg
- https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5a2711f68fd4d2c5ea9d0da9/1656542622545-1DLVO6852KTW69CI6E2M/EketahunaMowerRacing-01-1600px-1200x675-1.jpg
- https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5a2711f68fd4d2c5ea9d0da9/1656543386040-2EK0RP5NADYJLWJVUUFN/Girls+that+invest_screenshot.png
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain IntelligenceLovemedia.nz — via Sitetech Solutions Ltd T/A SiteName, 6 months old, hosted on SquarespacePASS
Unknown
34 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
6 months
Registered October 30, 2025
Status unknown
Protects against DNS spoofing
Squarespace
ASN AS53831
198.49.23.144
Sitetech Solutions Ltd T/A SiteName
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice