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Infrastructure

· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
85
GRADE
B
FIX
0
REVIEW
9
PASS
8
INFO
0
Probed from Madrid, Spain
403 Forbidden
Checks
17
8 PASS 9 REVIEW
B
DNS Records
1 A records, 29 ms lookup
REVIEW
1 A records, 29 ms lookup
Info::
Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)
Got: 150.171.109.82
Info::
Single A record — no DNS redundancy
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Info::
Has 1 IPv6 (AAAA) record(s)
Got: 2603:1061:14:51::1
Warning::
CNAME record at zone apex
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
Got: 1eddotgov-bychftfshqf3gqcr.a01.azurefd.net
Info::
No NS records found
Info::
No MX records — email not configured via DNS
Info::
No SPF record found in TXT records
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Info::
DNS resolution time: 29 ms
Got: 29 ms
A150.171.109.82
AAAA2603:1061:14:51::1
CNAME1eddotgov-bychftfshqf3gqcr.a01.azurefd.net
NS—
MX—
TXT—
CAALookup not available with standard resolver
Resolved in 29 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more ▾

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Why this matters

CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.

Learn more ▾

RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.

Source: RFC 1034

SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.

Why this matters

Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.

Learn more ▾

SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.

Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)

B
DNSSEC
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
REVIEW
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
Info::
DNSSEC is not deployed
The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).
B
CAA Records
No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)
REVIEW
No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)
Info::
No CAA records published
Without CAA records, any publicly-trusted CA can issue certificates for this domain. Adding a CAA record (`yourdomain. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`) restricts issuance to CAs you authorize. Required by CAB Forum baseline since 2017; the default of 'any CA' is widely supported but is the broader attack surface for issuance fraud.
C
Reverse DNS
Action
0/2 IPs match cert SAN
REVIEW
0/2 IPs match cert SAN
Info::
PTR lookup failed for 150.171.109.82: lookup 150.171.109.82: no such host
No reverse DNS record set for this IP. Common on bare cloud-VM IPs without provider-side PTR; not a security issue.
Info::
PTR lookup failed for 2603:1061:14:51::1: lookup 2603:1061:14:51::1: no such host
No reverse DNS record set for this IP. Common on bare cloud-VM IPs without provider-side PTR; not a security issue.
B
Crawlability
no robots.txt, no sitemap
REVIEW
no robots.txt, no sitemap
Info::
No robots.txt found
robots.txt is optional but recommended. It tells search engine crawlers which pages to index.
Info::
No sitemap.xml found
A sitemap helps search engines discover and index your pages more efficiently.

robots.txt is optional but recommended. It tells search engine crawlers which pages to index.

Why this matters

No robots.txt — crawlers fetch /robots.txt and get 404; not breaking but means default crawl behavior with no directives or sitemap reference.

Learn more ▾

A minimal robots.txt with `User-agent: * / Allow: / / Sitemap: https://example.com/sitemap.xml` covers the basics. Without it, crawlers behave fine but lose the sitemap signal and can't be selectively blocked from crawl-traps.

Source: robotstxt.org

A sitemap helps search engines discover and index your pages more efficiently.

Why this matters

No sitemap.xml — Google relies on crawl-graph discovery alone, slowing indexing of deep or fresh URLs.

Learn more ▾

A sitemap accelerates Google's discovery of new and updated content. Most CMSes auto-generate one; static-site frameworks need a build-step plugin. Reference it from robots.txt and submit in Search Console to confirm Google can fetch it.

Source: sitemaps.org / Google Search Central

robots.txt No robots.txt found

No robots.txt found

This is fine for most sites — a missing robots.txt allows all crawling by default.

sitemap.xml No sitemap found

No sitemap found

Adding a sitemap helps search engines discover your pages.

B
URL Variants
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
REVIEW
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
Info::
www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: www)
Critical::
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
Got: HTTP 403 Expected: 301 redirect to HTTPS

www / non-www

200https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/hearings-and-appeals/hearings-and-appeals-secretary-decisions
301https://ed.gov/laws-and-policy/hearings-and-appeals/hearings-and-appeals-secretary-decisions

Preferred variant: www

Trailing Slash

403https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/hearings-and-appeals/hearings-and-appeals-secretary-decisions/
200https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/hearings-and-appeals/hearings-and-appeals-secretary-decisions

HTTP → HTTPS

403http://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/hearings-and-appeals/hearings-and-appeals-secretary-decisions

HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS

B
TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations
154 days until leaf cert expires — 2 issues to address
REVIEW

Certificate validity

154
days left
0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

  • Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
  • Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
B
CDN & Delivery
Azure Front Door (CONFIG_NOCACHE)
REVIEW
Azure Front Door (CONFIG_NOCACHE)
Info::
Document is served via Azure Front Door CDN
Got: delegation 1eddotgov-bychftfshqf3gqcr.a01.azurefd.net
Info::
CDN cache status: CONFIG_NOCACHE
Document served via CDN: Azure Front Door
Provider Azure Front Door Cache Status CONFIG_NOCACHE Evidence delegation 1eddotgov-bychftfshqf3gqcr.a01.azurefd.net
B
Operational Status Page
No status page link detected
REVIEW
No status page link detected
Info::
No operational status page link detected
Status pages communicate planned maintenance and incidents to users -- a hallmark of operationally-mature services. Most SaaS teams publish one via Atlassian Statuspage, Instatus, BetterUptime, or a self-hosted Cachet. Smaller sites legitimately don't need one; flagged as Info, not a failure.
A+
Subdomain Takeover
No subdomain takeover risk detected
PASS
No subdomain takeover risk detected
Info::
CNAME does not point at a known takeover-able service
A+
Multi-Resolver DNS Speed
Mean 37ms across 3 resolvers (spread 11ms)
PASS
Mean 37ms across 3 resolvers (spread 11ms)
Info::
Google: 32ms
Got: 32ms via 8.8.8.8:53
Info::
Cloudflare: 37ms
Got: 37ms via 1.1.1.1:53
Info::
Quad9: 43ms
Got: 43ms via 9.9.9.9:53
A+
Redirect Chain
0 redirect(s), 63 ms total
PASS
0 redirect(s), 63 ms total

https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/heari...

63 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#URLStatusTimeProtocolServer
1https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/heari...40363 msHTTP/1.1
A+
IPv6 Readiness
IPv6 reachable (17 ms)
PASS
IPv6 reachable (17 ms)
Info::
IPv6 is configured and reachable at 2603:1061:14:51::1
Got: 17 ms connect
IPv6 Ready
AAAA Records 2603:1061:14:51::1 Connection Reachable (17 ms)
A+
Domain Intelligence
ed.gov — via get.gov, 29 years, 5 months old
PASS
ed.gov — via get.gov, 29 years, 5 months old
Info::
Domain registered until Aug 13, 2027 (10 months remaining)
Info::
DNSSEC is enabled
Info::
Registrar: get.gov
Warning::
Registrar lock is NOT enabled
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Domain expiry

299 days

August 13, 2027

SSL certificate

154 days

Issued by DigiCert Inc

Domain age

29 years, 5 months

Registered October 2, 1997

DNSSEC

Enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

Unknown

2603:1061:14:d7::1

Registrar

get.gov

Unlocked 6 NS records
Expiry timeline
Today
+1 year
Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)
Recommended actions
  • Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Registrar get.gov
Created October 2, 1997 (29 years, 5 months ago)
Expires August 13, 2027 (10 months)
Last Updated August 14, 2026
Name Servers a1-100.akam.net, a10-67.akam.net, a13-64.akam.net, a28-65.akam.net, a3-65.akam.net, a6-64.akam.net
DNSSEC Enabled
Registrant REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
Hosting
IP Address 2603:1061:14:d7::1
Data source: rdap (0.4s)

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice

A+
HTTP Probe Timing
Total 117 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown
PASS
DNS Lookup DNS Lookup — time to resolve the domain name to an IP address.
49 ms
TCP Connect TCP Connect — time to establish a TCP connection to the server.
17 ms
TLS Handshake TLS Handshake — time to complete the HTTPS encryption handshake.
26 ms
Time to First Byte Time to First Byte — how long the server takes to respond with the first byte of data.
117 ms
Total Time Total request time from DNS lookup through full response.
117 ms

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 49 ms TCP Connect 17 ms TLS Handshake 26 ms Server Processing 26 ms Content Transfer 0 ms
A+
CDN Cache Observability
Cache state: CONFIG_NOCACHE
PASS
Cache state: CONFIG_NOCACHE
Info::
CDN cache state observable via 1 header(s)
Got: x-cache=CONFIG_NOCACHE
A+
Health Check Endpoint
Auth-protected health endpoint at https://www.ed.gov/health (HTTP 403)
PASS
Auth-protected health endpoint at https://www.ed.gov/health (HTTP 403)
Info::
Auth-protected health endpoint exposed at https://www.ed.gov/health
Got: https://www.ed.gov/health
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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