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https://www.acethehimalaya.com

Infrastructure

· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
87
GRADE
B
FIX
0
REVIEW
10
PASS
7
INFO
0
Probed from Madrid, Spain
200 OK
Checks
17
7 PASS 10 REVIEW
B
DNSSEC
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
REVIEW
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
Info::
DNSSEC is not deployed
The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).
B
CAA Records
No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)
REVIEW
No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)
Info::
No CAA records published
Without CAA records, any publicly-trusted CA can issue certificates for this domain. Adding a CAA record (`yourdomain. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`) restricts issuance to CAs you authorize. Required by CAB Forum baseline since 2017; the default of 'any CA' is widely supported but is the broader attack surface for issuance fraud.
C
Reverse DNS
Action
0/1 IPs match cert SAN
REVIEW
0/1 IPs match cert SAN
Info::
PTR lookup failed for 144.126.243.95: lookup 144.126.243.95: no such host
No reverse DNS record set for this IP. Common on bare cloud-VM IPs without provider-side PTR; not a security issue.
C
IPv6 Readiness
Action
No IPv6 support
REVIEW
No IPv6 support
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records found
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No IPv6 Support
About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B
HTTP Probe Timing
Total 1232 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown
REVIEW
DNS Lookup DNS Lookup — time to resolve the domain name to an IP address.
73 ms
TCP Connect TCP Connect — time to establish a TCP connection to the server.
166 ms
TLS Handshake TLS Handshake — time to complete the HTTPS encryption handshake.
167 ms
Time to First Byte Time to First Byte — how long the server takes to respond with the first byte of data.
572 ms
Total Time Total request time from DNS lookup through full response.
1.23 s

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 73 ms TCP Connect 166 ms TLS Handshake 167 ms Server Processing 166 ms Content Transfer 660 ms
B
TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations
66 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to address
REVIEW

Certificate validity

66
days left
0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

  • Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
  • Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
  • Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
C
CDN & Delivery
Action
Assets on Cloudflare (host cdn.jsdelivr.net, 3 assets); document served directly from origin (DigitalOcean)
REVIEW
Assets on Cloudflare (host cdn.jsdelivr.net, 3 assets); document served directly from origin (DigitalOcean)
Warning::
Document not behind existing CDN (Cloudflare serves the assets)
The page's subresources are delivered by Cloudflare (cdn.jsdelivr.net, 3 assets), but the HTML document itself comes straight from the origin (DigitalOcean). Routing the document through the CDN already in use is the cheapest latency win available here -- the provider relationship, the certificate and the config already exist. A short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate suits HTML that changes often; if the response is genuinely per-user, edge TLS termination alone still removes a full round trip from every visitor's first byte.
Got: delegation cdn.jsdelivr.net.cdn.cloudflare.net
Info::
Assets on Cloudflare: cdn.jsdelivr.net (assets: 3), cache HIT
Got: delegation cdn.jsdelivr.net.cdn.cloudflare.net
Info::
Assets on Cloudflare: cdnjs.cloudflare.com (assets: 3), cache HIT
Got: cf-ray: a5271521ab40bb21-CDG
Warning: Assets on a CDN, document is not: Cloudflare
Document origin DigitalOcean

Asset hosts on a CDN

  • cdn.jsdelivr.net — Cloudflare · assets: 3 · Cache Status: HIT
  • cdnjs.cloudflare.com — Cloudflare · assets: 3 · Cache Status: HIT

Other asset hosts

  • connect.facebook.net — assets: 2 · below probe threshold
  • www.googletagmanager.com — assets: 2 · below probe threshold
  • app.rybbit.io — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
  • apps.elfsight.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
  • grwapi.net — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
  • www.chatbase.co — assets: 1 · below probe threshold

The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.

B
CDN Cache Observability
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
REVIEW
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
Info::
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
Without an X-Cache / CF-Cache-Status / X-Vercel-Cache / Age header, you can't tell from outside whether a request hit the cache or went to origin. Operationally important: enables debugging stale-content reports and verifying cache rules. Most managed CDN platforms emit at least one of these by default; absence often means the platform's diagnostic headers are stripped at an upstream proxy.
B
Operational Status Page
No status page link detected
REVIEW
No status page link detected
Info::
No operational status page link detected
Status pages communicate planned maintenance and incidents to users -- a hallmark of operationally-mature services. Most SaaS teams publish one via Atlassian Statuspage, Instatus, BetterUptime, or a self-hosted Cachet. Smaller sites legitimately don't need one; flagged as Info, not a failure.
B
Health Check Endpoint
No conventional health endpoint found
REVIEW
No conventional health endpoint found
Info::
No conventional health endpoint found
Health endpoints (/health, /healthz, /status, /ping, /api/health) let uptime monitors, load balancers, and orchestration systems (Kubernetes, ECS, Fly.io) verify the service is alive. Marketing sites and small services often skip them legitimately; flagged as Info, not a failure. Probe results: /api/health: connection error, /health: connection error, /healthz: connection error, /ping: connection error, /status: connection error.
A
DNS Records
1 A records, 38 ms lookup
PASS
1 A records, 38 ms lookup
Info::
Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)
Got: 144.126.243.95
Info::
Single A record — no DNS redundancy
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records
Warning::
CNAME record at zone apex
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
Got: acethehimalaya.com
Info::
2 nameserver(s) configured
Got: peyton.ns.cloudflare.com, harleigh.ns.cloudflare.com
Info::
1 mail exchanger(s) configured
Info::
SPF record present in TXT
Info::
DNS resolution time: 38 ms
Got: 38 ms
A144.126.243.95
AAAA—
CNAMEacethehimalaya.com
NSpeyton.ns.cloudflare.com, harleigh.ns.cloudflare.com
MX
0 acethehimalaya-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT
SPF v=spf1 include:secureserver.net -all
CAALookup not available with standard resolver
Resolved in 38 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more ▾

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Why this matters

CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.

Learn more ▾

RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.

Source: RFC 1034

A+
Subdomain Takeover
No subdomain takeover risk detected
PASS
No subdomain takeover risk detected
Info::
CNAME does not point at a known takeover-able service
A+
Multi-Resolver DNS Speed
Mean 41ms across 3 resolvers (spread 32ms)
PASS
Mean 41ms across 3 resolvers (spread 32ms)
Info::
Google: 27ms
Got: 27ms via 8.8.8.8:53
Info::
Cloudflare: 37ms
Got: 37ms via 1.1.1.1:53
Info::
Quad9: 59ms
Got: 59ms via 9.9.9.9:53
A+
Redirect Chain
No redirects — direct access
PASS
No redirects — direct access
Info::
No redirects — direct access
Got: https://www.acethehimalaya.com

https://www.acethehimalaya.com

663 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#URLStatusTimeProtocolServer
1https://www.acethehimalaya.com200663 msHTTP/1.1nginx
A+
Crawlability
robots.txt present, sitemap with 9 URLs
PASS
robots.txt present, sitemap with 9 URLs
Info::
robots.txt is present
Got: 861 bytes
Info::
sitemap.xml is present
Info::
sitemap.xml is valid XML
Info::
sitemap.xml contains 9 entries
Info::
Sitemap index with 9 child sitemaps
Info::
robots.txt references sitemap
robots.txt 200 OK
Size 861 B Sitemaps referenced 1 User-agents ChatGPT-User, Claude-Web, Meta-Externalagent, Googlebot, *, GPTBot, Meta-WebIndexer, YouBot, Applebot, SemrushBot, OAI-SearchBot, Google-Extended, Amazonbot, Bingbot, ClaudeBot, MJ12bot, Gemini-Deep-Research, PerplexityBot, Meta-ExternalFetcher, AhrefsBot Blocking No — crawling allowed
User-agent: *

Disallow: /wp-admin/

Allow: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php



User-Agent: ChatGPT-User

Allow: /



User-Agent: GPTBot

Allow: /



User-Agent: OAI-SearchBot

Allow: /



User-Agent: Claude-Web

Allow: /



User-Agent: Gemini-Deep-Research

Allow: /



User-Agent: Google-Extended

Allow: /



User-Agent: PerplexityBot

Allow: /



User-Agent: Meta-ExternalFetcher

Allow: /



User-Agent: Meta-WebIndexer

Allow: /



User-Agent: Meta-Externalagent

Allow: /



User-Agent: Amazonbot

Allow: /



User-Agent: YouBot

Allow: /



User-Agent: Applebot

Allow: /



User-Agent: Googlebot

Allow: /



User-Agent: Bingbot

Allow: /



User-Agent: ClaudeBot

Allow: /



User-Agent: AhrefsBot

Crawl-delay: 10



User-Agent: SemrushBot

Crawl-delay: 10



User-Agent: MJ12bot

Crawl-delay: 10



Sitemap: https://www.acethehimalaya.com/sitemap_index.xml
sitemap.xml 200 OK
Type Sitemap Index URLs 9 entries Valid XML Yes
Child Sitemaps:
A+
URL Variants
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
PASS
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
Info::
www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: www)
Info::
HTTP correctly redirects to HTTPS permanently
Got: HTTP 301

www / non-www

200https://www.acethehimalaya.com/
301https://acethehimalaya.com/

Preferred variant: www

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://www.acethehimalaya.com/ → https://www.acethehimalaya.com/

Consistent

A+
Domain Intelligence
acethehimalaya.com — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 20 years old, hosted on DigitalOcean
PASS
acethehimalaya.com — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 20 years old, hosted on DigitalOcean
Info::
Domain registered until Jan 24, 2028 (1 years, 3 months remaining)
Info::
DNSSEC is not enabled
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Info::
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Warning::
Registrar lock is NOT enabled
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Info::
Hosting: DigitalOcean
Got: AS14061
Domain expiry

441 days

January 24, 2028

SSL certificate

66 days

Issued by Let's Encrypt

Domain age

20 years

Registered January 24, 2007

DNSSEC

Not enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

DigitalOcean

ASN AS14061

144.126.243.95

Registrar

GoDaddy.com, LLC

Unlocked 2 NS records
Expiry timeline
Today
+1 year
Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)
Recommended actions
  • Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
  • Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Registrar GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created January 24, 2007 (20 years ago)
Expires January 24, 2028 (1 years, 3 months)
Last Updated January 25, 2026
Name Servers harleigh.ns.cloudflare.com, peyton.ns.cloudflare.com
DNSSEC Not enabled
Hosting
IP Address 144.126.243.95
ASN AS14061 (DIGITALOCEAN-ASN - DigitalOcean, LLC, US)
Provider DigitalOcean
Data source: rdap (0.4s)

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Why this matters

Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.

Learn more ▾

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.

Source: ICANN / RFC 4033

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice

All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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