Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNS Records1 A records, 33 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 150.171.110.117 |
| AAAA | 2603:1061:14:174::1 |
| CNAME | mpweb.azurefd.net |
| NS | — |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
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Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
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RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
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SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/2 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
CHTTP Probe TimingActionTotal 1791 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownREVIEW
Connection waterfall
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations160 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN & DeliveryAzure CDN (CONFIG_NOCACHE)REVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
AMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 59ms across 3 resolvers (spread 89ms)PASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au
1262 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au | 200 | 1262 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (17 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 859 URLsPASS
Sitemap: https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au/sitemap.xml
User-agent: *
Crawl-delay: 10
Disallow: /bin/
Disallow: /config/
Disallow: /umbraco/
Disallow: /umbraco_client/
- https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au/
- https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au/about-us/
- https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au/about-us/melbourne-polytechnic-values/
- https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au/about-us/corporate-information/
- https://www.melbournepolytechnic.edu.au/about-us/corporate-information/corporate-governance/
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencemelbournepolytechnic.edu.au — via Education Services Australia Limited, hosted on Microsoft AzurePASS
Unknown
160 days
Issued by DigiCert Inc
Unknown
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Microsoft Azure
ASN AS8075
52.255.54.134
Education Services Australia Limited
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
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DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
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Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice