Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BRedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 1070 ms totalREVIEW
https://texas.gov
603 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.texas.gov:443/
467 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://texas.gov | 302 | 603 ms | HTTP/1.1 | awselb/2.0 |
| 2 | https://www.texas.gov:443/ | 200 | 467 ms | HTTP/1.1 | AmazonS3 |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
If permanent, use 301 instead.
302 (Found) is for genuinely temporary redirects — if this redirect is permanent, switch to 301 to preserve SEO equity.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Search engines treat 302 as temporary, keeping the original URL indexed and not transferring full link equity to the destination. Use 301 (Moved Permanently) for permanent redirects (HTTP→HTTPS, www-vs-non-www, URL restructures).
Source: Google Search Central
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
CURL VariantsActionwww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Use 301 (permanent) instead of 302 (temporary)
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations231 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Prefer TLS 1.3 — TLS 1.2 is acceptable but TLS 1.3 removes RSA key exchange and improves latency
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records2 A records, 150 ms lookupPASS
| A | 75.2.85.206, 99.83.171.12 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns.capnet.state.tx.us, ns5.capnet.state.tx.us, ns9.tex-an.net, merlin.texan.state.tx.us |
| MX | 0 pigeon.state.tx.us 2 emu.tx.net |
| TXT | g6bv01schrk1tnn28n7ofo2086 orgodtbd4obcsemi442u9rqcos SPF v=spf1 ip4:141.198.193.120/29 ip4:168.58.222.3 ip4:206.16.212.246 ip4:204.66.40.... |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 303 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Allow: /
Disallow: /government-services-directory/*/
Disallow: /texas-state-agencies-departments/*/
Disallow: /es/directorio-servicios-gubernamentales/*/
Disallow: /es/agencias-departamentos-del-estado-de-texas/*/
Disallow: /search/?search=
Disallow: /es/search/?search=
Sitemap: https://www.texas.gov/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligencetexas.gov — via get.gov, 28 years, 11 months old, hosted on AWSPASS
81 days
September 2, 2026
231 days
Issued by Amazon
28 years, 11 months
Registered October 2, 1997
Enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS16509
75.2.85.206
get.gov
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Renew the domain or enable auto-renewal to prevent accidental expiry
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice