Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedActionMean 246ms across 3 resolvers (spread 473ms)FIX
DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNS Records1 A records, 597 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 161.104.32.46 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns1.reg.ru, ns2.reg.ru |
| MX | — |
| TXT | yandex-verification: bea7c3b01a0916f5 google-site-verification=EwdgnnX4yj64X7cX4wyM8nb8vCRQbvPuJW-Ooy-C-Zk |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/1 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BHTTP Probe TimingTotal 1441 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownREVIEW
Connection waterfall
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations77 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://ark-russia.ru
1293 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://ark-russia.ru | 200 | 1293 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx/1.24.0 (Ubuntu) |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 4 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Allow: /
Disallow: /admin
Disallow: /api/
Sitemap: https://ark-russia.ru/sitemap.xml
Sitemap: https://ark-russia.ru/image-sitemap.xml
LLMs-txt: https://ark-russia.ru/llms.txt
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligenceark-russia.ru — via REGRU-RU, 8 years, 4 months old, hosted on SELECTEL-MSK - JSC Selectel, RUPASS
276 days
April 29, 2027
77 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
8 years, 4 months
Registered April 29, 2018
Status unknown
Protects against DNS spoofing
SELECTEL-MSK - JSC Selectel, RU
ASN AS50340
161.104.32.46
REGRU-RU
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice