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Infrastructure

· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
87
GRADE
B
FIX
0
REVIEW
10
PASS
7
INFO
0
Probed from Madrid, Spain
200 OK
Checks
17
7 PASS 10 REVIEW
B
DNS Records
2 A records, 41 ms lookup
REVIEW
2 A records, 41 ms lookup
Info::
Resolves to 2 IPv4 address(es)
Got: 76.223.58.8, 13.248.175.166
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records
Warning::
CNAME record at zone apex
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
Got: s.multiscreensite.com
Info::
No NS records found
Info::
No MX records — email not configured via DNS
Info::
No SPF record found in TXT records
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Info::
DNS resolution time: 41 ms
Got: 41 ms
A76.223.58.8, 13.248.175.166
AAAA—
CNAMEs.multiscreensite.com
NS—
MX—
TXT—
CAALookup not available with standard resolver
Resolved in 41 ms

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Why this matters

CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.

Learn more ▾

RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.

Source: RFC 1034

SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.

Why this matters

Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.

Learn more ▾

SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.

Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)

B
DNSSEC
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
REVIEW
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
Info::
DNSSEC is not deployed
The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).
B
CAA Records
No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)
REVIEW
No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)
Info::
No CAA records published
Without CAA records, any publicly-trusted CA can issue certificates for this domain. Adding a CAA record (`yourdomain. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`) restricts issuance to CAs you authorize. Required by CAB Forum baseline since 2017; the default of 'any CA' is widely supported but is the broader attack surface for issuance fraud.
B
Reverse DNS
0/2 IPs match cert SAN
REVIEW
0/2 IPs match cert SAN
Info::
PTR for 76.223.58.8 does not match any cert SAN: a4883ea39ca559091.awsglobalaccelerator.com
Common when behind a CDN or shared hosting (PTR points at the provider's hostname). Mismatch can also affect mail deliverability if this IP sends email -- many MTAs reject mail when forward+reverse DNS disagree.
Info::
PTR for 13.248.175.166 does not match any cert SAN: a4883ea39ca559091.awsglobalaccelerator.com
Common when behind a CDN or shared hosting (PTR points at the provider's hostname). Mismatch can also affect mail deliverability if this IP sends email -- many MTAs reject mail when forward+reverse DNS disagree.
C
IPv6 Readiness
Action
No IPv6 support
REVIEW
No IPv6 support
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records found
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No IPv6 Support
About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B
TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations
50 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to address
REVIEW

Certificate validity

50
days left
0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

  • Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
  • Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
  • Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
C
CDN & Delivery
Action
Assets on AWS CloudFront (host irp.cdn-website.com, 23 assets); document served directly from origin
REVIEW
Assets on AWS CloudFront (host irp.cdn-website.com, 23 assets); document served directly from origin
Warning::
Document not behind existing CDN (AWS CloudFront serves the assets)
The page's subresources are delivered by AWS CloudFront (irp.cdn-website.com, 23 assets), but the HTML document itself comes straight from the origin. Routing the document through the CDN already in use is the cheapest latency win available here -- the provider relationship, the certificate and the config already exist. A short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate suits HTML that changes often; if the response is genuinely per-user, edge TLS termination alone still removes a full round trip from every visitor's first byte.
Got: x-amz-cf-id: aCYPRFTgc3F5eSBV4J0Ebnr1K41yCQ8bULdz6t74lREouVgc_hnkAw==
Info::
Assets on AWS CloudFront: irp.cdn-website.com (assets: 23), cache Hit from cloudfront
Got: x-amz-cf-id: aCYPRFTgc3F5eSBV4J0Ebnr1K41yCQ8bULdz6t74lREouVgc_hnkAw==
Info::
Assets on AWS CloudFront: static.cdn-website.com (assets: 3), cache Hit from cloudfront
Got: x-amz-cf-id: PRmD1BrWlJVe6knXAWE47jTG5WC_LTG5Zabfj6vp3yChh4P92hmaaA==
Warning: Assets on a CDN, document is not: AWS CloudFront
Document origin not attributed

Asset hosts on a CDN

  • irp.cdn-website.com — AWS CloudFront · assets: 23 · Cache Status: Hit from cloudfront
  • static.cdn-website.com — AWS CloudFront · assets: 3 · Cache Status: Hit from cloudfront

Other asset hosts

  • cdn.tailwindcss.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
  • d32hwlnfiv2gyn.cloudfront.net — assets: 1 · below probe threshold

The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.

B
CDN Cache Observability
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
REVIEW
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
Info::
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
Without an X-Cache / CF-Cache-Status / X-Vercel-Cache / Age header, you can't tell from outside whether a request hit the cache or went to origin. Operationally important: enables debugging stale-content reports and verifying cache rules. Most managed CDN platforms emit at least one of these by default; absence often means the platform's diagnostic headers are stripped at an upstream proxy.
B
Operational Status Page
No status page link detected
REVIEW
No status page link detected
Info::
No operational status page link detected
Status pages communicate planned maintenance and incidents to users -- a hallmark of operationally-mature services. Most SaaS teams publish one via Atlassian Statuspage, Instatus, BetterUptime, or a self-hosted Cachet. Smaller sites legitimately don't need one; flagged as Info, not a failure.
B
Health Check Endpoint
No conventional health endpoint found
REVIEW
No conventional health endpoint found
Info::
No conventional health endpoint found
Health endpoints (/health, /healthz, /status, /ping, /api/health) let uptime monitors, load balancers, and orchestration systems (Kubernetes, ECS, Fly.io) verify the service is alive. Marketing sites and small services often skip them legitimately; flagged as Info, not a failure. Probe results: /api/health: 404, /health: 404, /healthz: 404, /ping: 404, /status: 404.
A+
Subdomain Takeover
No subdomain takeover risk detected
PASS
No subdomain takeover risk detected
Info::
CNAME does not point at a known takeover-able service
A
Multi-Resolver DNS Speed
Mean 54ms across 3 resolvers (spread 31ms)
PASS
Mean 54ms across 3 resolvers (spread 31ms)
Info::
Google: 41ms
Got: 41ms via 8.8.8.8:53
Info::
Quad9: 51ms
Got: 51ms via 9.9.9.9:53
Info::
Cloudflare: 72ms
Got: 72ms via 1.1.1.1:53
A+
Redirect Chain
No redirects — direct access
PASS
No redirects — direct access
Info::
No redirects — direct access
Got: https://www.mastertechca.com

https://www.mastertechca.com

91 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#URLStatusTimeProtocolServer
1https://www.mastertechca.com20091 msHTTP/1.1nginx
A+
Crawlability
robots.txt present, sitemap with 6 URLs
PASS
robots.txt present, sitemap with 6 URLs
Info::
robots.txt is present
Got: 109 bytes
Info::
sitemap.xml is present
Info::
sitemap.xml is valid XML
Info::
sitemap.xml contains 6 entries
Info::
robots.txt references sitemap
robots.txt 200 OK
Size 109 B Sitemaps referenced 1 User-agents * Blocking No — crawling allowed
# Sitemap is also available on /sitemap.xml
Sitemap: https://www.mastertechca.com/sitemap.xml
User-agent: *
sitemap.xml 200 OK
Type URL Set URLs 6 entries Valid XML Yes
Sample URLs:
A+
URL Variants
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
PASS
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
Info::
HTTP correctly redirects to HTTPS permanently
Got: HTTP 301

www / non-www

200https://www.mastertechca.com/
https://mastertechca.com/

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://www.mastertechca.com/ → https://www.mastertechca.com/

Consistent

A+
Domain Intelligence
mastertechca.com — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 12 years, 7 months old, hosted on AWS
PASS
mastertechca.com — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 12 years, 7 months old, hosted on AWS
Info::
Domain registered until Jun 2, 2029 (2 years, 7 months remaining)
Info::
DNSSEC is not enabled
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Info::
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Warning::
Registrar lock is NOT enabled
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Info::
Hosting: AWS
Got: AS14618
Domain expiry

950 days

June 2, 2029

SSL certificate

50 days

Issued by Let's Encrypt

Domain age

12 years, 7 months

Registered May 5, 2014

DNSSEC

Not enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

AWS

ASN AS14618

35.172.94.1

Registrar

GoDaddy.com, LLC

Unlocked 2 NS records
Expiry timeline
Today
+1 year
Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)
Recommended actions
  • Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
  • Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Registrar GoDaddy.com, LLC
Created May 5, 2014 (12 years, 7 months ago)
Expires June 2, 2029 (2 years, 7 months)
Last Updated November 10, 2025
Name Servers ns69.domaincontrol.com, ns70.domaincontrol.com
DNSSEC Not enabled
Hosting
IP Address 35.172.94.1
ASN AS14618 (AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com, Inc., US)
Provider AWS
Data source: rdap (0.3s)

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Why this matters

Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.

Learn more ▾

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.

Source: ICANN / RFC 4033

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice

A+
HTTP Probe Timing
Total 156 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown
PASS
DNS Lookup DNS Lookup — time to resolve the domain name to an IP address.
63 ms
TCP Connect TCP Connect — time to establish a TCP connection to the server.
1 ms
TLS Handshake TLS Handshake — time to complete the HTTPS encryption handshake.
60 ms
Time to First Byte Time to First Byte — how long the server takes to respond with the first byte of data.
155 ms
Total Time Total request time from DNS lookup through full response.
157 ms

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 63 ms TCP Connect 1 ms TLS Handshake 60 ms Server Processing 31 ms Content Transfer 2 ms
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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