Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.FHTTP Probe TimingActionTotal 9834 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownFIX
Connection waterfall
DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/2 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations87 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
A+DNS Records1 A records, 36 ms lookupPASS
| A | 66.241.125.149 |
| AAAA | 2a09:8280:1::112:4174:0 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | dns2.registrar-servers.com, dns1.registrar-servers.com |
| MX | 10 eforward2.registrar-servers.com 10 eforward1.registrar-servers.com 10 eforward3.registrar-servers.com 15 eforward4.registrar-servers.com 20 eforward5.registrar-servers.com |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 39ms across 3 resolvers (spread 48ms)PASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://potentialspouse.com
96 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://potentialspouse.com | 200 | 96 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Fly/a589ac11 (2026-05-08) |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (24 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 15 URLsPASS
# PotentialSpouse is a private matchmaking application — profile
# data, codenames, chat content, and any signed-in route MUST NOT be
# indexed by search engines. The public marketing surface (homepage,
# /about, /use-cases, /support, /terms, /privacy, /blog) is fair game
# and helps people find the product when they have a real need; the
# rest is denied.
#
# See `project/PRD.md` §3 and `project/reveal_ladder.md` for the
# anti-recognition posture these rules reinforce.
User-agent: *
# Authenticated app surface — never indexable.
Disallow: /wall
Disallow: /notifications
Disallow: /connections
Disallow: /connections/
Disallow: /profile
Disallow: /profile/
Disallow: /settings
Disallow: /settings/
Disallow: /report
Disallow: /admin
Disallow: /admin/
# Auth + onboarding surfaces — also denied so a returning user's
# codename never appears in a search snippet via cached state.
Disallow: /users/
Disallow: /auth/
Disallow: /onboarding/
# Operational endpoints.
Disallow: /api/
Disallow: /health
Disallow: /readiness
Disallow: /dev/
# Everything else (homepage + public marketing pages + blog) is
# allowed by default — Allow lines exist so robots that read both
# rules pick the most permissive match.
Allow: /
Allow: /about
Allow: /use-cases
Allow: /support
Allow: /terms
Allow: /privacy
Allow: /blog
Allow: /blog/
Sitemap: https://potentialspouse.com/sitemap.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencepotentialspouse.com — via NameCheap, Inc., 2 days oldPASS
357 days
May 7, 2027
87 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
2 days
Registered May 7, 2026
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2a09:8280:1::112:4174:0
NameCheap, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Newly registered domain — build backlinks and content to establish SEO trust
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Newly registered domains may face SEO trust challenges. Search engines generally give more authority to older domains. This is informational — not a problem to fix.
Informational: domain age. Newer domains may have lower trust signals in spam/security filters.
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice