Security - https://potentialspouse.com BeaverCheck Audit

F

Email Security

Action

no DMARC, SPF: ~all

FIX

no DMARC, SPF: ~all

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

No DKIM detected via common selectors

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures from your domain.

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

Why this matters

Without DMARC, anyone can send phishing emails using your domain name.

Learn more ▾

DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that fails SPF/DKIM checks for your domain. With a strict 'p=reject' policy, spoofed emails get bounced; without it they reach the inbox. Domains used in phishing campaigns lose deliverability and brand trust fast.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

D

Permissions-Policy

Action

No header set

FIX

No header set

No Permissions-Policy header

Consider adding a Permissions-Policy header to restrict browser feature access from embedded content.

No Permissions-Policy header set.

Without this header, embedded iframes can request access to sensitive device features.

Suggested header

Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()

B

Security Headers

8 of 10 headers properly configured

REVIEW

8 of 10 headers properly configured

Strict-Transport-Security is properly configured (consider adding preload)

Got: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options header is missing

This header prevents clickjacking by controlling who can embed your page in a frame. Set it to DENY or SAMEORIGIN.

Expected: DENY

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Permissions-Policy header is missing

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Content-Security-Policy is present

Got: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline…

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy is set

Got: credentialless

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: Fly/a589ac11 (2026-05-08)

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

This header prevents clickjacking by controlling who can embed your page in a frame. Set it to DENY or SAMEORIGIN.

Expected: DENY

Why this matters

Without frame protection, your site can be embedded in a hostile page and used for clickjacking.

Learn more ▾

Clickjacking overlays your site under a transparent malicious page so users click invisible buttons. Setting X-Frame-Options: DENY (or a modern frame-ancestors CSP directive) blocks the embedding entirely. There's almost never a legitimate reason to allow it.

Source: OWASP / MDN

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Why this matters

Permissions-Policy locks down browser APIs you don't use — without it, every page can request camera/mic/geolocation if XSS lands.

Learn more ▾

By default every page can request the camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, and dozens more. Permissions-Policy turns off the ones you don't need so a future bug can't quietly start using them. It's a defense-in-depth header — one line, big surface reduction.

Source: MDN / W3C

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

B

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

C

security.txt

Action

No security.txt file found

REVIEW

No security.txt file found

security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.

Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

1 inline style attribute(s) detected

REVIEW

1 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 1 inline style(s) is low. Affected element types include: header. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

B

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

Trusted Types not enabled

REVIEW

Trusted Types not enabled

Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A

Content Security Policy

7 of 10 CSP checks passed

PASS

7 of 10 CSP checks passed

Raw CSP policy

Got: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-N6lDyoIpsBuhDyjG6oxDA8C1' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; connect-src 'self' wss: https://challenges.cloudflare.com; font-src 'self' data:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'

default-src directive is set

Got: default-src 'self'

No 'unsafe-inline' in script source

No 'unsafe-eval' in script source

No wildcard in script source

object-src falls back to default-src

base-uri is properly restricted

Got: base-uri 'self'

frame-ancestors directive is set

Got: frame-ancestors 'none'

form-action directive is missing

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'

upgrade-insecure-requests is not set

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

Why this matters

Without upgrade-insecure-requests, any HTTP subresource link survives as a mixed-content warning instead of auto-upgrading.

Learn more ▾

Adding `upgrade-insecure-requests` to your CSP turns every http:// subresource fetch into https:// at the browser layer. One-line defense against accidental mixed content from legacy links or third-party widgets.

Source: MDN CSP

Parsed Policy

default-src 'self'

img-src 'self'data:https:

style-src 'self''unsafe-inline'

script-src 'self''nonce-N6lDyoIpsBuhDyjG6oxDA8C1'https://challenges.cloudflare.com

frame-src 'self'https://challenges.cloudflare.com

connect-src 'self'wss:https://challenges.cloudflare.com

font-src 'self'data:

frame-ancestors 'none'

base-uri 'self'

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 87 days)

Got: 2026-08-05T13:30:42Z

Certificate chain has 2 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: ECDSA-SHA384

Certificate covers 1 domain(s)

Got: potentialspouse.com

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=E8,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=potentialspouse.comIssuer CN=E8,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-05-07T13:30:43Z → 2026-08-05T13:30:42ZExpires in 87 days SANs potentialspouse.comSignature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 6a284d44212e5f42b4ab623df480f0423a2

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=E8,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2024-03-13T00:00:00Z → 2027-03-12T23:59:59ZExpires in 306 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 63959363c24e7082715918bfc3d7ed56

A+

Cookie Security

1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed

PASS

1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed

Cookie '_potential_spouse_key' has the Secure flag

Cookie '_potential_spouse_key' has the HttpOnly flag

Cookie '_potential_spouse_key' has SameSite=Lax

1 cookies analyzed

Name	Secure	HttpOnly	SameSite	Size	Issues
_potential_spouse_key	✓	✓	Lax	141 B	—

A+

Cookie Hygiene

All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

PASS

All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface

PASS

No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface

No new-tab links present

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

Source Map Exposure

No source maps accessible (probed 1 candidate URL(s))

PASS

No source maps accessible (probed 1 candidate URL(s))

No source maps accessible across 1 probed candidate(s)

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

No security.txt found

Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✓ Not found	Security Policy	—
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised

HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.

HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains)

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)