Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNS Records4 A records, 584 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 18.239.50.73, 18.239.50.125, 18.239.50.55, 18.239.50.58 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | d12dj7ytm0t2bf.cloudfront.net |
| NS | ns-1336.awsdns-39.org, ns-1833.awsdns-37.co.uk, ns-324.awsdns-40.com, ns-758.awsdns-30.net |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations323 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://www.toronto.ca
338 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.toronto.ca | 200 | 338 ms | HTTP/1.1 | CloudFront |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 8 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /wp-admin/
Disallow: readme.html
Disallow: license.txt
Disallow: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
#
#legacy
Disallow: /legdocs/2002/agendas/council/cc021029/ny11rpt/cl005.pdf
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2009/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2010/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2011/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2012/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2013/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2014/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2015/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2016/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2017/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2018/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2019/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2020/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2021/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2022/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2023/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2024/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2025/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2026/sv/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2009/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2010/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2011/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2012/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2013/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2014/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2015/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2016/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2017/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2018/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2019/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2020/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2021/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2022/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2023/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2024/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2025/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2026/sy/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2009/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2010/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2011/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2012/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2013/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2014/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2015/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2016/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2017/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2018/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2019/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2020/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2021/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2022/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2023/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2024/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2025/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2026/sx/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2009/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2010/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2011/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2012/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2013/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2014/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2015/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2016/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2017/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2018/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2019/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2020/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2021/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2022/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2023/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2024/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2025/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2026/sz/bgrd/
Disallow: /wp-content/uploads/2019/03/8da8-CommitteeofAdjustment-NorthYork-Agenda-March-7-2019.pdf
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2019/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2020/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2021/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2022/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2023/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2024/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2025/dg/bgrd/
Disallow: /legdocs/mmis/2026/dg/bgrd/
Sitemap: https://www.toronto.ca/sitemap.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/sitemap-misc.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap2.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap3.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap4.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap5.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap6.xml
- https://www.toronto.ca/page-sitemap7.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencetoronto.ca — via Webnames.ca Inc., 24 years, 4 months old, hosted on CITY-OF-TORONTO - City of Toronto, CAPASS
2863 days
April 18, 2034
323 days
Issued by Entrust Limited
24 years, 4 months
Registered April 19, 2002
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
CITY-OF-TORONTO - City of Toronto, CA
ASN AS14836
206.130.170.36
Webnames.ca Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice